Japan's China policy in the post-Cold War era has often been portrayed as a strategic response to the rise of China in East Asia. Existing literature on the subject most often assumes that Japan's China policy has been guided by a unified, well-calculated foreign strategy vis-à-vis China's growing national power since the late 1990s. In this article, the author challenges this assumption and argues that domestic politics within Japan oftentimes plays a decisive role in Japan's foreign policy towards China. By examining Japan's response toward Chinese pressure over the Yasukuni issue between 2006 and 2007, this article offers an alternative interpretation of Japan's China policy by highlighting the domestic legitimacy of individual political leaders. The author further suggests that impacts of other aspects of Japanese domestic politics on its foreign policy toward China, such as regime transition/the frequent change of prime ministers and the rivalry between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats, should also be taken up for more thorough investigation.
It is unnecessary to make a clear stance on the Yasukuni issue as it will be utilized by China, South Korea and politicians within Japan.
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Since the late 1990s, relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have been undergoing tremendous structural changes within East Asian international politics. Japan's China policy since this period has in great part been viewed as a strategic response to the rise of China in East Asia. Many works in the existing literature, from the writings of scholars to journalists and diplomatic observers, assume that Japan is a unitary actor and that its China policy has been guided by a unified, well-calculated foreign strategy with a focus on China's growing national power in the last two decades.
This article challenges the assumption that Japan's response toward China's rise is guided by this aforementioned "unified, well-calculated foreign strategy". Instead, it will be argued that domestic politics within Japan often play a decisive role in Japan's foreign policy towards China. By examining Japan's response toward Chinese pressure over the Yasukuni issue between 2006 and 2007, this article offers an alternative perspective to Japan's China policy by focusing on the domestic legitimacy of individual political leaders in Japan's China policymaking. The article further suggests that other aspects of Japanese domestic politics, such as regime transition, the frequent change of prime ministers and the coordination problem between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats, should also be studied in detail.
Conventional Analysis of Japan's China Policy
Since the 1990s, Japan's China policy has often been viewed as a strategic response to the rise of China. The consequence of the rise of China to the international material structure has been viewed as a major motivation behind Japan's shifting China policy. Mike Mochizuki, for example, identified four strategic options that emerged in the domestic debate within Japan with regards to the rise of China: 1) cooperative engagement with a soft hedge, 2) competitive engagement with a hard hedge, 3) balancing and containment, and 4) strategic accommodation. 2 Mochizuki points out that recent evolution of Japan's strategy towards China is compatible with different theoretical expectations such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and liberalism. He argues that Japan has shifted away from friendship diplomacy toward a mixed strategy that involves both cooperative engagement and realistic balancing to hedge against the potential threats that rising China may pose in the future.
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Scholars of Sino-Japanese relations and international relations studies also interpreted Japan's China policy through a foreign strategy perspective. Some scholars argue that, precisely because of the collapse of "the 1955 system" and the decline of progressive forces within Japan since the mid-1990s, the neo-conservative and nationalistic forces within Japan would be able to take an assertive stance, one that intends to lead Japan toward the path of the "normal country." 4 The essence of the so-called "normal country," according to Ryu, for example, mainly refers to the constitutional revision of Article Nine, the state's right to mourn its war dead and to improve the low level of patriotism among the Japanese public.
5 By following this stream of analysis, Japan's assertive policy toward China in certain areas (such as maritime disputes and the Yasukuni problem) has been seen as an effort to promote neo-conservatism, historical revisionism and defense policy reforms, aiming to transform Japan into a normal nation-state in the 21 st century. Zhu argues, for example, that Japan's assertive China policy visible in various policy areas in recent years has been determined by strategic choices prompted by the rise of China in East Asia.
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It would be absurd, of course, to deny the impact of strategic calculation in the decision-making process of Japan's China policy. But most often, from a microanalytical perspective, domestic politics act in a much more complex way within Japan that is less related to foreign strategy calculation. Conventional arguments often take for granted that Japan's foreign policy in most issue areas related to China is guided by a calculated, unified foreign policy strategy. But these views overlook the impact of Japanese domestic politics on its China policy, and fail to explain why Japan sometimes favors a cooperative policy toward China in certain issue areas, if its China policy is perceived to be assertive.
7 Given the frequent shifts within the Japanese cabinet in the recent decade, there is also the question of whether Japan has articulated a long-term, consistent strategy toward the rise of China since the mid-1990s. As the literature on domestic foundation to foreign policy suggests, we must take into account the domestic political process within Japan while analyzing Japanese diplomacy toward rising China.
Domestic Source of Japan's China Policy: A Framework
Domestic politics has been the central theme in studying a state's foreign policy. In this article, it is proposed that Japan's China policy can be understood through the perspective of the domestic legitimacy of individual leaders. As early as the 16 th century, Italian politician Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1557) outlined the importance of retaining power for a ruler in his book The Prince (1531). Machiavelli takes a pessimistic stance toward human nature. In his view, a ruler needs to adopt moral standards different from those of ordinary individuals to ensure the survival of the state in general and the ruler himself in particular. A ruler who "wants to act the part of a good man in all circumstances will bring about his own ruin." A ruler who wants to hold power, Machiavelli stresses, must learn how to not be good and to know when it is necessary to use this knowledge. 8 In this sense, Machiavelli suggests that it is much safer for a ruler to be feared than loved.
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The importance of political survival of individual leaders during international negotiation was frequently discussed by IR scholars working on the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy. Peter Gourevitch, for example, proposes the second image reversed theory, suggesting that individual leaders tend to mobilize the nation's international resources to strengthen their own political legitimacy in a domestic power rivalry. Individual leaders would find that a diplo- of members of the winning coalition, a challenger can replace the leader in office. Coalition members come from a group called the "selectorate", which consists of those individuals who might find themselves in the winning coalition. In a democracy, the winning coalition is the group of voters who elect the leader. With a large winning coalition and large selectorate in the democratic institution, which increase the probability that a member of the current leader's coalition will be included in a challenger's coalition, the bonds between leaders and their coalition members become weaker. In this sense, with the desire to survive and retain power, political leaders in a democracy tend to spend more effort maintaining their winning coalition supporters' loyalties, thus influencing the selection of domestic and foreign policies they pursue. This interest explains why bad policy might sometimes be good politics, and similarly, good policies bad politics.
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This study shares the assumptions stated above. In this article, Japan's China policy is examined by focusing on the domestic political legitimacy of individual leaders. The term "legitimacy", according to Geuss, can be applied to "a certain specific government or regime" or to "the personnel who claim to be the representatives of an organization."
16 This paper assumes that political leaders of a state, particularly in democracies, would need to consider a foreign policy decision by calculating the consequences of such a decision in the context of their domestic political welfare. Extending this framework, as Japan is a democracy with a parliamentary system, it will be assumed that seeking election or reelection on the national party level and thusly consolidating majority support within the ruling party are of vital interest to the domestic political survival of Japanese prime ministers. This study contends that the domestic political legitimacy of individual leaders is a vital factor that affects Japan's China policy. The orientation of Japan's China policy is dependent on whether a cooperative policy would undermine a prime minister's chance of staying in office. A cooperative policy is more likely to pass if it does not threaten to undermine, or rather, has potential to contribute to, the domestic interests of an office-seeking prime minister. To illustrate the argument, Japan's response to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue during the Abe administration (2006-07) has intentionally been chosen. This case is selected because it meets important methodological criteria.
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Of particular interest here in Abe's case is that before assuming office in 2006, Abe consistently supported prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He was widely regarded as a postwar born Japanese prime minister determined to lead On the other hand, however, although he enjoyed majority support within the LDP and general public, Abe found himself in a challenging situation after assum-ing premiership. The major reason Abe was able to gain such tremendous support from the majority of the LDP, apart from Koizumi's influence, was that he was widely conceived by major faction leaders as a person able to lead the LDP to victory in the upcoming upper house election in August 2007. In other words, Abe would face a serious legitimacy problem within the LDP if he could not win the forthcoming election. In this sense, maintaining majority support and widening the domestic coalitions within the LDP as long as possible became Abe's primary political objectives in his first year of office. Policies related to Yasukuni were thus carefully considered in the context of domestic politics.
After becoming prime minister in September 2006, despite the fact that he had majority support within the LDP and the general public, Abe was faced with a clear test. Because Abe's perceived ability to secure a win for the LDP in the August 2007 upper house election factored so heavily in his popularity among major faction leaders within the LDP, the upcoming upper house election was especially charged. Three major facets stood out here. The first concerned the influence of local elections in April 2007 to the upper house election. It was widely recognized within the LDP that a concentration of time and effort of many local LDP members toward their own local election rather than the national-level upper house election might result in unavoidable failure for the LDP election campaign. The second was the influence of the reform in local towns. Originally, most members of local town assemblies were from the LDP. When the number of local towns decreased due to the administrative reform, LDP power on a local level shrunk drastically, causing a negative impact on the national-level election. The third was the influence of Koizumi's reform. As many local areas were dissatisfied with the policy advocated by the Koizumi administration, which focused on economic development in urban areas, voters in rural areas tended to support the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Ozawa Ichiro. With these three upcoming domestic challenges in mind, keeping the current majority support as long as possible while widening the domestic coalitions as soon as possible within the LDP and the general public became Abe's primary political objectives for his first year in office. In this sense, how to deal with China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue was given careful consideration within the context of domestic politics.
A limited compromise with ambiguity over the Yasukuni issue would not undermine but rather contribute to Abe's political survival in domestic politics. Starting from 2006, sufficient evidence indicates that Abe started to treat the Yasukuni issue strategically for two purposes: 1) to win the LDP presidential election, and 2) to consolidate domestic support after assuming premiership.
For the first purpose, Abe's motivation was to prevent the Yasukuni issue from casting a negative shadow on his LDP presidential election campaign. 
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The priority of seeking office influenced Abe's responses to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue. In Abe's calculation, the Yasukuni issue was no longer an appropriate card for seeking domestic support as it was for Koizumi, as many members within the LDP thought maintaining the stability of the new administration and preparing for the upcoming election should be the primary concerns. Instead, an implicit compromise to China's demands would conversely strengthen support for Abe in terms of ability to handle foreign affairs and widen his domestic coalition. Seko Hiroshige, one of his senior political advisors, also openly admitted in August 2006 to believing that Abe regards the Yasukuni issue as a useful diplomatic card to China and thusly approaches the issue strategically.
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Based on Table 1 As governmental policy over the Yasukuni issue shifted, Abe adopted an ambiguous strategy at both international and domestic tables, refraining from stating whether or not he would visit Yasukuni Shrine. Public opinion in Japan was gradually re-manipulated by the Abe administration. Public statements made by Abe changed tremendously, displaying increasing ambiguity since the summer of 2006. Abe's basic strategy was to avoid making an explicit statement on the Yasukuni issue. In a TV program on June 3, Abe stated that he did not intend to make a clear statement on whether he would visit Yasukuni Shrine. Abe further stressed that if the issue became a diplomatic problem, it would not be necessary to address it during the LDP presidential election. In a public speech on June 11, Abe further solidified his equivocal position by stressing that it was unnecessary to take a clear stance on the Yasukuni issue, lest it be utilized by China, South Korea and politicians within Japan.
41 This stance remained unchanged until the last day On the other hand, at the international front, Abe avoided creating the impression among his domestic audience that he made a compromise with China. On October 6, the Chinese consulate in Tokyo Embassy Kong Quanyou stated that China believed that Abe would not visit Yasukuni Shrine within his term as prime minister. On the same day, Abe implicitly refuted China's statement and stressed that no such agreement had been made between the two countries, secretly or otherwise, previous to the conclusion of the Japan-China top leader summit in October 2006.
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Yasukuni was doubtlessly a stepping-stone for Abe. However Abe may have rationalized his actions to both sides, it should be acknowledged that by abstaining from Yasukuni visits while embracing a strategy that allowed ambiguity, Abe was able to resume a bilateral summit meeting with China that had been suspended for almost five years. The summit meeting in early October 2006, in return, benefited Abe domestically. A poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun after Abe's visit to Beijing in October revealed that 83% of those polled commented positively on Abe's diplomatic initiative with China and South Korea. 52% valued his style in dealing with the Yasukuni issue. 
2) Alternative Interpretations: A Comparison
What other factors might account for the responses of the Abe administration to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue? This section discusses two alternative explanations for making sense of this puzzle. While acknowledging the certain explanatory power of these factors, it will be demonstrated why these explanations are insufficient in explaining the abnormal response of the Abe administration to China in 2006-07.
Economic Interdependence
Firstly, one may argue that Abe adopted a cooperative policy toward Chinese pressure by offering analysis from the perspective of economic interdependence. By following the logic that the chance of conflict between two countries can be largely reduced given a dynamic of economic interdependence, it is tempting to view Abe's compromise to Chinese pressure as an effort to deepen economic interdependence between China and Japan. Upon this interpretation, Abe acted as a national leader prioritizing the national interest when he ceased visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
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This economic interdependence-based argument is somehow convincing. But it cannot answer a very fundamental question: According to official data, China had assumed the rank of number one trading partner to Japan in 2004. 45 54 Considering the similar climate and circumstances of the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the analysis focused on the role of the US is not able to explain the inconsistency of Japan's response to Chinese pressure.
Conclusion
As seen in the previous analysis, political survival analysis, which stresses the domestic legitimacy of individual leaders, can offer a logical explanation to Japan's responses to Chinese pressure over the Yasukuni issue during the Abe administration. This article suggests that the low domestic cost of international cooperation in terms of office-seeking is what led Abe to compromise to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue. Ceasing visits to Yasukuni Shrine allowed him to avoid potential criticism from his opponents within the LDP during the presidential election and helped foster diplomatic reconciliation with China in 2006, which in return offered Abe an opportunity to broaden his domestic coalition within the LDP before the upcoming upper house election. The power rivalry in office-seeking was found to be a vital factor behind Japan's cooperative policy towards China vis-à-vis the Yasukuni issue during the Abe administration. The case of Abe also has a profound implication for the study of Japan's China policy in general. As shown in the case study in this paper, domestic political rivalry of individual leaders, rather than foreign strategic calculation to China, was at the heart of Japan's policy toward China over the Yasukuni issue. Abe utilized the seemingly nationalistic and sentimental controversy over Yasukuni Shrine for his domestic purposes. Thus, Japan's China policy in certain issue areas may not necessarily follow a unified China policy, but may, with little thought of China itself, be guided by a strategy for winning support at home.
Other aspects of Japanese domestic politics are also relevant. After studying the Chinese fishing boat collision incident near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010, Wan, for instance, pointed out that we may also take into account other factors in Japanese party politics that may further complicate the relations of the two countries. 55 Here, I briefly suggest two additional aspects of Japanese domestic politics for further research:
1) The frequent change of prime ministers / Regime Transition Japan has unusually unstable leadership, with prime ministers cycling through rather frequently in the past decade. Unstable leadership may cause inconsistency in foreign policy, leading to misperceptions or miscalculations of previously settled issues. In addition, the regime transition from LDP to DPJ in Japan has also posed a major challenge to the consistency of the country's China policy. For instance, it is open to doubt whether the LDP is well organized in terms of communication with the DPJ on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China. The Chinese fishing boat collision incident in 2010 indicated that the DPJ's top leaders may not have fully understood the complexity of the island dispute with China, resulting in Chinese fury.
2) The conflict between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats
The issue of coordination between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats on foreign affairs has long been one of the central problems of the Japanese political system. It is imperative that whether the role of decision maker on the Japanese side is well coordinated, and that diplomatic message is being well received by the key person on the Japanese side. For instance, during the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fishing boat incident in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not properly inform the Kan administration about the Chinese protests. It was also reported later that it was bureaucrats specializing on China, rather than the party leaders in Kantei, who played the decisive role in communicating with the Chinese government.
56 Clearly, a lack of coordination within Japanese government could pose a major problem to decision-making in Japan's China policy, and this issue is worth further detailed investigation in the future.
